Greg Detre
Wednesday, 17 January, 2001
Lucy Allais, History of Philosophy II
Is Locke�s criterion
of personal identity defensible???
Williams tells two stories, intended to illustrate contrasting ways of
acrophobia
problem of PI (torture/�1000) � Nietzsche ER???
does it change things if he talks about torturing the body??? (pg 55)
I/me present/memories distinction � where from???
the devil is in the detail of the brain operations � what is preserved and at what level/complexity
what about me as �this brain in this body�, i.e. my sensory connections + body qualities matter???
yes, these will make a difference to the �me of that body� from the second I step into the body, but AT that moment, it is my neurons that matter
if the information transfer amounts to a physical transfer, both examples are the same???
do I accept (v) as changing A and being a different person/self???
if not, then I have to reject the first example?
which is more important, (i) or (iii)?
depends what�s lost (e.g. implicit memories) in the amnesia�
perhaps our psychological sense of self is bound up with our bodies, even though the substrate of our PI is body-independent
Williams is making a materialist/functionalist claim
I don�t care about past forgotten torture
PI = dispositions???
PI as the flame from a candle rather than a ball being passed around
(iv) adds nothing. (v) at least adds a complete functional persona
explanatory gap, candle
that Williams can be persuasive in both directions shows how flawed our understanding is, and how misleading our intuition
discussing the diachronic is a good angle
Locke on sleep/unconsciousness
criticism of Locke = memory loss
erosion vs discontinuity, Reid ancestral/transitivity
super-me = the complete set of memories, of which mine are a subset
does the amnesic lose his subconscious/implicit memories � psychological connectedness
matter as nexus of electrons
resurrection as big problem for empiricists
PI just dies with the transfer
commisurotomy
siamese twins � Locke�s definition � 1 living body, 2 PIs
Locke � simpler and more defensible than modern accounts
Ben C � no, Locke�s is not defensible because of memory loss
Locke � what about discontinuous but far-reaching memories?
what�s wrong with a memory of a memory?
why is �memory� a good criterion of PI?
assumption of a conscious, recallable imagistic memory
unconscious memory makes more sense = better definition of personality
what are those unalterable features of MY personality?
self as Swinburnian unity vs Humean bundle of perceptions
PI as unified � can you divide it up?
self as more than the sum of my memories
self as fuzziness � deleting memories 1 at a time � amnesia
problem of categories
radical implications but more intuitive
amoeba fission
self as possibility/memory space � like quantum superpositions
pin down lots of electrons, memory over time pins you down
we�re being too concretish, substantial
gradual change amounts to overall qualitative change of state (e.g. swapping neurons for microchips, one by one)
continuum of the self
If, as nice and well-brought up materialists, we say that the character and qualities of our mental make-up bear a systematic relationship to the structure of our brains, then we must conclude that our self tracks changes in our brains. After all, this assumption is what leads Williams to assume that brain-wipes and information transfers underpin his desired changes in memories and personality. But then don�t we have to conclude that changes in our brains, even minute ones, must have knock-on effects on our self.
the reason that the self feels unified is that our brain employs a distributed representation, so it�s very difficult to disentangle memories
Additionally, David Hume proposes that because there is no seemingly separate impression of the self from which one can experience, there is no reason to believe one has a self. According to Hume, the only sense of identification one may have is attributed to constantly changing consciousness. Therefore, Hume concludes that personal identity is fictional. By reducing the mind to a stream of consciousness, Hume also disregards subconscious states such as sleep, where the mind exists without entering conscious awareness. Furthermore (as suggested by Kant), personal identity is not the succession of awareness, but the awareness of succession. If that which is aware (in this case the mind) passed with awareness, there would exist no awareness of succession. However, being that it does not pass, it is logically reasonable to suggest that there is a transcendent self beyond the mere stream of consciousness that Hume implies � web page
If asked to pick out an individual strand in a
piece of rope from all the other strands, we would need a criterion of identity
to decide whether two pieces of fluff constituted part of the same strand or
not.
functionalist assumption
who wrote first � Parfit or Williams???
what is a Lockean person
what is the problem with ascribing Locke the transitivity of memory thing to account for memory loss
is there a difference between discussions of �self� and PI???